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About BiEPAG
The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) 
Is a co-operation initiative of the European Fund for the Balkans (EFB) and Centre 
for the Southeast European Studies of the University of Graz (CSEES) with the aim 
to promote the European integration of the Western Balkans and the consolidation 
of democratic, open countries in the region. BiEPAG is composed by prominent 
policy researchers from the Western Balkans and wider Europe that have 
established themselves for their knowledgeand understanding of the Western 
Balkans and the processes that shape the region. Current members of the BiEPAG 
are: Dimitar Bechev, Florian Bieber, Blerjana Bino, Srđan Cvijić, Milica Delević, 
Srđan Majstorović, Natasha Wunsch, Marika Djolai, Vedran Džihić, Dejan Jović, 
Marko Kmezić, Jovana Marović, Milan Nič, Corina Stratulat, Dane Taleski, Nikolaos 
Tzifakis, Alida Vračić, Shpend Emini, Zoran Nechev, Tena Prelec and Donika Emini.
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Overcoming enlargement 
deadlock: an action plan for the 
incoming EU leadership 
EU enlargement policy appears to have reached a deadlock. Following 
years of stagnation and relative neglect, the European Commission’s at-
tempts in 2018 to reinvigorate the EU’s engagement with the Western Bal-
kans and to provide ‘a credible enlargement perspective’1 to the region have 
been thwarted by a lack of commitment on the part of (some) EU member 
states. The October 2019 European Council decision to once again post-
pone the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Mace-
donia is but the latest in a long series of delays in the enlargement process 
over the past years. This latest stunt has left the region reeling, with local 
leaders alternately endorsing a rapprochement with Russia and China2 or 
calling for snap elections to confirm their countries’ European path.3
Reluctance on the part of the EU member states to endorse Skopje and 
Tirana’s formal progress on the road towards accession, despite the Eu-
ropean Commission’s positive recommendation, reflects concerns over 
the aspirant countries’ lack of preparedness. Moreover, it mirrors growing 
scepticism among European citizens regarding the admission of further 
countries into the Union and.
1  ”A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western 
Balkans (COM(2018) 65 final)”, European Commission, Strasbourg, 6 February 2018.
2  “Vucic: EU’s decision on Skopje and Tirana justifies closer ties with Russia and 
China”, European Western Balkans, 23 October 2019; https://europeanwesternbalkans.
com/2019/10/23/vucic-eus-decision-on-skopje-and-tirana-justifies-closer-ties-with-russia-
and-china/
3   “Zaev: snap election should be held as soon as possible”, European Western Balkans, 19 
October 2019; https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/10/19/zaev-snap-election-should-
be-held-as-soon-as-possible/
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In the case of France, it also corresponds to a perceived opposition be-
tween the deepening and the widening of the EU.4 At the same time, the de-
terioration of the quality of democracy and the rule of law and widespread 
state capture across the region are realities that represent an additional 
hurdle to the EU institutions’ engagement for positive change.
It is in this sensitive political climate that the new EU leadership will take 
office by the end of the year. The EU institutions’ new leading figures will 
need to convince both member state leaders and their populations of the 
benefits of EU enlargement, while simultaneously being confronted with 
persistent state capture and the enduring weakness of the rule of law in 
the Western Balkans. Striking this delicate balance will require political 
skill as well as more appropriate tools to communicate with EU citizens 
and support domestic change among the EU aspirants. 
This policy brief offers suggestions on how these important challenges 
may be met. It begins by laying out the background to the current situa-
tion, acknowledging the Commission’s recent efforts to boost the credi-
bility of the Western Balkans’ membership perspective. It then points to 
three key obstacles to a credible EU engagement in the region. First, it 
singles out the member states’ opposition towards further enlargement at 
a time when the EU is struggling with multiple internal and external crises. 
Second, it points to the European citizens’ enlargement scepticism, which 
encourages certain national governments to resist further steps in the ac-
cession process. Third, it highlights enduring state capture in the Western 
Balkans as a central obstacle to a successful EU engagement in the re-
gion. On the basis of this analysis, this policy brief puts forward a series 
of recommendations for the EU’s incoming leadership to address some of 
the current shortcomings and advance towards a more constructive and 
transformative involvement in the Western Balkans.
4   Wunsch, Natasha (2017): Between indifference and hesitation: France and EU 
enlargement towards the Balkans, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17(4): 541-
554.
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From autopilot to tentative 
reengagement
After a lengthy period during which EU enlargement policy was on auto-
pilot,5 the year 2018 seemed to bring a very welcome shift in the EU’s ap-
proach to the Western Balkans. Fifteen years after the EU member states 
confirmed an EU accession perspective for all Western Balkan countries at 
the June 2003 Thessaloniki summit, the European Commission reassert-
ed the promise of a ‘credible enlargement perspective’ in the region.6 The 
2018 strategy provides a rather accurate analysis of remaining problems 
in the region, noting in particular the ongoing weakness of the rule of law 
as well as ‘clear elements of state capture, including links with organised 
crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration.’7 At 
the same time, it balances criticism by highlighting the EU’s willingness to 
step up its support for the Balkans through a series of ‘flagship initiatives.’ 
In addition, for the first time, it offers a tentative time horizon for accession 
in 2025 to frontrunners Montenegro and Serbia, despite underlining the 
‘extremely ambitious’ nature of this timeline.8
Yet while the Commission’s strategy appeared to send a positive signal 
that the EU was breaking away from its previous wait-and-see attitude to-
wards the Western Balkans, in the follow-up the member states were un-
willing to endorse the Commission’s renewed engagement in the Balkans 
with the same degree of enthusiasm. 
5   Kmezic, Marko, Florian Bieber, Dane Taleski, Jovana Marovic, and Nikolaos Tzifakis, 
“Policy Brief: Western Balkans and the EU: Beyond the Autopilot Mode”, BiEPAG; http://
biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BIEPAG-Western-Balkans-and-the-EU-Beyond-the-
Autopilot-Mode.pdf 
6   European Commission, “A credible enlargement strategy”.
7   European Commission, “A credible enlargement strategy”, p. 3.
8   Ibid. p. 2
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At the EU-Western Balkans summit in Sofia, held three months after the 
publication of the Commission’s strategy, the member states dealt a sym-
bolic blow to the show of EU unity behind a renewed engagement in the 
Western Balkans.9 Both the absence of Spain from the formal part of the 
event and France’s explicitly enlargement-sceptic stance undermined the 
substantive message that the European Commission had hoped the sum-
mit would send. The weak language of the final summit declaration, which 
failed to endorse the Commission’s mention of a 2025 time horizon for fur-
ther accessions, underscored the lack of unity behind the Commission’s 
desire to upgrade the Union’s engagement. In a similar vein, the June 2018 
European Council disappointed those who had hoped that the summit 
would bring concrete progress for individual countries, a situation that has 
not changed until today. 
The most recent summit of the Berlin process10 in Poznan underscored 
that the main divide with regards to enlargement policy runs between 
member states. Poland, the summit’s host country, spearheaded an initi-
ative pushing for the swift opening of negotiations with North Macedonia 
and Albania. Yet all but two of the twelve supporting countries (the excep-
tions being Italy and Austria) had only recently entered the EU, signalling a 
growing division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states on the question of 
further enlargement. In contrast to this supportive group, the Netherlands 
stuck to its strong emphasis on full compliance with all membership cri-
teria – the so-called ‘strict but fair’ approach – to justify its opposition to 
further formal progress.11 
9  Sofia Declaration, 17 May 2018; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/34776/sofia-
declaration_en.pdf
10  Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, “The Future of the Berlin Process,” March 2017, 
http://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/The-Future-of-the-Berlin-Process.pdf.
11   “Stef Blok: The Netherlands is your friend, but strict and fair”, Independent Balkan News 
Agency, 15 July 2018; https://balkaneu.com/stef-blok-the-netherlands-is-your-friend-but-
strict-and-fair/
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French President Emmanuel Macron has taken an even stronger enlarge-
ment-sceptic stance, declaring that an internal reform of the EU would need 
to precede any further admissions.12 The most recent European Council in 
October 2019 confirmed the gap between the Commission’s pro-enlarge-
ment position and the more sceptical stance prevalent among some of the 
founding member states. 
Challenge #1:  Member states as gatekeepers
Political conditionality is one of the key tools through which the EU seeks 
to stimulate transformation in aspiring countries. The effectiveness of 
conditionality relies on credibility, and the latter requires consistency on 
the part of the EU. Yet the growing contestation of EU enlargement and 
the increasing divergence in evaluations carried out by EU institutions and 
by several member states make the formulation of a consistent message 
towards the Balkans increasingly difficult. Whereas both the European 
Commission and the European Parliament have repeatedly called for the 
opening of negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, several mem-
ber states have opposed this step. This creates a tension between com-
mitments made by the EU institutions and their ability to deliver on them.
Formally, EU member states have always had the last word when it comes 
to endorsing every formal step towards a new country’s accession to the 
Union. However, over the past years, the member states have come to play 
an ever more prominent role in monitoring and critically evaluating pro-
gress, often ignoring the Commission’s avis and frequently delaying or 
blocking progress of individual aspirants on the basis of bilateral issues 
or specific reform dimensions rather than the situation on the ground in 
these countries.13 What is more, the member states have gradually sought 
to strengthen their control over outcomes on the dossier. 
12   Quatremer, Jean, “Union europeénne : Macron franco contre l’élargissement”, Libération, 
18 October 2019; https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2019/10/18/union-europeenne-macron-
franco-contre-l-elargissement_1758494
13   Balfour, Rosa, Corina Stratulat et al., “EU member states and enlargement towards the 
Balkans”, EPC Issue Paper 79, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 22 July 2015;  https://www.
epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=2&pub_id=5832
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The German Bundestag in particular has taken a key role in assessing pro-
gress in the region itself, rather than relying on the opinion of the Com-
mission, and strict parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs now also shapes 
national positions on enlargement in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Swe-
den. Meanwhile, France has introduced the possibility of a referendum on 
enlargement unless the government can amass a large favourable major-
ity in the Assemblée Nationale, while the Netherlands and Austria have 
also been considering new constitutional requirements for ratifying future 
accession treaties. These mechanisms may make the process more demo-
cratic, but they also allow the member states to diverge in functional terms 
from the agreed standards and procedures for handling enlargement.
In addition, progress in the Western Balkans’ EU accession process has 
frequently been derailed not only by outstanding challenges within the 
region, but also by considerations linked to national politics and public 
opinion on enlargement in the member states.  Preoccupations related, 
for example, to the freedom of movement of people, minorities, asylum 
seekers, the sustainability of welfare systems, bilateral disputes, econom-
ic prospects, border definition, and poor governance have made EU capi-
tals increasingly assertive about which Balkan countries should advance 
towards accession and under which conditions.14 In fact, North Macedonia 
had seen its EU path blocked for many years previously because of its ac-
rimonious name dispute with Greece. 
Such incursions, which are becoming ever more frequent, including from 
direct neighbours like Croatia,15 as well as other issues such as, for exam-
ple, the position of the five EU member states that do not recognise Koso-
vo’s independence, may set the bar high for the aspiring countries for good 
reason. But they also tie enlargement to the vagaries of domestic politics, 
making it an unpredictable process.
14   Ibid.
15   For example, Croatia blocked the start of negotiations on Chapters 23 and 24 with Serbia 
until its demands, related to war crime trials and Croatian minorities, were added to the list of 
requirements Serbia had to fulfil.
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Conditionality only works if it is consistent and credible, as well as driven 
politically by the overall commitment of the EU member states, as mani-
fested at key decision-making moments. The ongoing “creeping national-
isation”16 of enlargement has slowed down the process and weakened the 
policy’s leverage. It has also revealed that, despite the adoption of enlarge-
ment as a priority for the recent Austrian, Bulgarian, and Romanian Council 
Presidencies, the member states have lost their appetite for expansion. 
This has made it easier for other actors – most notably Russia – to meddle 
in and cosy up with countries like Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herze-
govina, frustrating the EU’s efforts to guarantee Europe’s security.
Overall, the renewed visibility and the deliberate use of their veto right by 
individual member states threatens the consistency and credibility of the 
EU’s enlargement policy. By bringing their own domestic contexts to bear 
on enlargement decisions, member states are undermining the agreed 
standards and procedures formulated at the EU level, thus undermining the 
merit-based nature of the enlargement policy. In particular, where progress 
is tied to specific domestic achievements – such as, for instance, the con-
clusion of the Prespa agreement putting an end to the Macedonian name 
dispute – failure to reward such achievements undermines the EU’s overall 
approach. In the case of North Macedonia, the decision of the latest Euro-
pean Council summit not to grant the opening of accession negotiations 
with the country has led the Macedonian President Stevo Pendarovski to 
declare that the use of the country’s new name is “on hold” until the start 
of membership talks.17 Since the EU played a key role in facilitating agree-
ment between Skopje and Athens precisely in order to remove the name 
dispute as an obstacle to the opening of accession negotiations, failure to 
live up to this commitment undermines the general credibility of the EU’s 
conditionality and its role as an international mediator.
16  Hillion, Christophe (2010), “The creeping nationalisation of the enlargement process”, 
SIEPS Paper, Stockholm.
17   “What will happen to North Macedonia – a new name on hold”, B92, 25 October 2019; 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2019&mm=10&dd=25&nav_id=107433
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Challenge #2:  Enlargement scepticism among EU citizens
The growing reluctance towards further enlargement on the part of the 
member states is mirrored by an increasingly sceptical public opinion to-
wards the admission of new countries. According to the latest Eurobarom-
eter that addressed the issue of enlargement, only 44% of EU citizens are 
in favour of admitting further countries into the Union, while 46% oppose 
such a move. At the level of individual member states, majorities in favour 
of enlargement are generally found among the recently-joined Eastern Eu-
ropean member states, whereas opposition to further accessions comes 
close to or even exceeds two thirds of the population in several Western 
European members (e.g. 69% in Austria, 63% in Germany, 61% in France).18
In the absence of strong supporters of EU enlargement, European publics 
are rarely if ever exposed to positive perspectives on future enlargements. 
Instead, the growing divergence between EU member states makes citi-
zens in richer countries particularly apprehensive about labour competi-
tion from new entrants, whereas poorer member states fear losing part of 
their subsidies to newly admitted members with an even lower socio-eco-
nomic performance. While the Central and Eastern European enlargement 
round was cast rather successfully as a ‘historical reunification of Europe’, 
a similarly compelling narrative for the Western Balkans is still missing. 
The prominence of the Western Balkan route during the 2015 refugee crisis 
brought the region back into spotlight, but failed to serve as a catalyst for 
a broader engagement towards EU accession as a framework to jointly 
address external challenges.19 
18   European Commission. Standard Eurobarometer 89 – Wave EB89.1. March 2018. p. 4 
and 25.
19   Wunsch, Natasha and Nikola Dimitrov, “Policy Brief: The migrant crisis: a catalyst for 
EU enlargement?”, BiEPAG, June 2016; http://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/The-
migrant-crisis-a-catalyst-for-EU-enlargement-web.pdf
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Preparing the ground for future accessions is crucial especially in light of 
the need for eventual ratification of accession treaties in all EU member 
states. As contestation of European integration increases, it is likely that 
in the future more countries will choose to link such ratification to positive 
referendums. The rejection by the Dutch voters of the Association Agree-
ment with Ukraine in April 2016 showed how quickly even non-binding 
consultations in EU member states can threaten year-long negotiations 
for international agreements with third countries. A similar scenario at the 
closing of membership negotiations with the Western Balkans would fuel 
resentment in the region, undermining the sustainability of reforms as well 
as the credibility not only of EU enlargement, but of the EU’s broader ability 
to pursue a coherent foreign policy.
Challenge #3:  Lack of tools to tackle state capture
Besides procedural issues related to the member states’ opposition and 
a hostile public opinion among European citizens, the weakness of the 
rule of law and pervasive state capture are objective reasons preventing 
the swift admission of the Western Balkan region into the EU. The lack of 
suitable tools that the EU has at its disposal to foster transformation un-
der less-than-ideal circumstances in the Balkans challenges its ability to 
engage credibly with the region. Whereas political leaders in the Western 
Balkans remain rhetorically committed to EU accession as their main pol-
icy objective, their defence of democratic standards and civil liberties, in 
many cases, suggests otherwise. 
This growing gap between formal compliance with European democratic 
standards, on the one hand, and the practice of liberal democracy20 on the 
other casts doubt upon the enduring effectiveness of the EU’s conditional-
ity and calls for the development of new channels and tools.
20  Richter, Solveig & Natasha Wunsch (2019), Money, Power, Glory. Journal of European 
Public Policy.
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The Commission’s reengagement in the region is articulated around a re-
newed emphasis on strict conditionality, which nevertheless fails to inte-
grate domestic partners as necessary local drivers of implementation. The 
Commission itself has recognised the need for societal commitment as a 
key precondition for successful reforms.21 To foster such conditions, the 
incoming EU leadership will need to go beyond bilateral engagement with 
the narrow circle of these countries’ executives and develop ways in which 
other domestic actors, including parliamentarians, civil society organisa-
tions, and citizens at large, can be involved to ensure adequate domestic 
deliberation around reforms and anchor these more firmly within the exist-
ing institutional landscape.
As recent developments in Hungary and Poland suggest, a conditionali-
ty-driven transformation cannot reach sufficient depth and lacks sustaina-
bility in the long run. Where governments comply with democratic require-
ments in exchange for progress in the membership negotiations, the risk 
is high that long-term conditions for democratic consolidation fail to be 
created. Instead, reforms become a technocratic endeavour and public 
consultation, as well as broader societal dialogue on the political direction 
of the country, are side-lined or fully undercut for the benefit of swift pro-
gress on the path towards EU accession. 
The suggested flagship initiatives contained in the Commission’s strate-
gy imply ever more invasive interventions on the part of the EU through 
‘expert missions’ sent to detail required reforms to public administrations 
across the region. 
Such an approach represents an upgrade in degree, but not in the nature 
of the EU’s engagement. Instead, they largely outline measures that tar-
get candidate country governments or aim for technical cooperation with 
executive bodies. In doing so, the European Commission misses the op-
portunity to build a bridge between EU institutions and publics who will 
eventually become European citizens. 
21   European Commission, “A credible enlargement strategy”, p. 3.
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Instead, it leaves the door open to executive-led transformation or, in a 
pessimistic scenario, the marginalisation of societal concerns by ruling 
elites who are eager to cement their own benefits rather than to implement 
changes that would benefit the broader population.
Commentators’ and analysts’ framing of 2018 as the ‘year of EU reengage-
ment in the Western Balkans’ raised hopes across the region that the EU’s 
policy of ‘business as usual’ had been transformed into a more active ap-
proach, more in sync with local priorities voiced, for instance, by organisa-
tions dealing directly with vulnerable populations, and more supportive of 
the kind of deep societal transformation required to set the Balkan coun-
tries on a stable path towards democracy. One of the enduring shortcom-
ings of the EU’s approach, however, has been its focus on technical details 
over the ‘bigger picture’ of democratic backsliding across the region. De-
spite the Commission’s strategy highlighting widespread state capture, EU 
institutions at large have remained silent on the wider trend of democratic 
backsliding, embodied in a rollback of the freedom of expression, including 
open attacks on independent media and the work of NGOs in several coun-
tries of the region. Failing to call out these tendencies confirms region-
al leaders in their expectations that the EU will be willing to tolerate and 
overlook ‘stabilitocracy’22 trends, as long as the countries maintain relative 
stability and a formal commitment to democratic governance.
Moreover, civil society actors are becoming increasingly marginalised.23 
While the European Commission has endorsed the crucial role that inde-
pendent media play in fostering and sustaining democracy, it has also 
overseen a process whereby reform-minded civil society actors have be-
come increasingly side-lined and even openly attacked by members of the 
political leadership. 
22   Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, “The Crisis of Democracy in the Western 
Balkans. An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion,” March 
2017, http://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TheCrisisofdemocracy.pdf.
23  Fagan, Adam and Natasha Wunsch (2018). Fostering institutionalisation? The impact of 
the EU accession process on state–civil society relations in Serbia. Acta Politica.
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The shrinking space for civil society is a reality across the region and 
weakens the societal tissue required to foster deep and durable democra-
tisation, beyond the mostly instrumental reforms undertaken in response 
to EU requirements.
In sum, to be successful, the EU’s reengagement in the Western Balkans 
requires not only a higher degree of commitment on the part of both EU 
institutions and member states, but also an upgrade to the EU’s toolbox. 
Conditionality and strict to-do-lists alone will not result in the far-reaching 
reforms that political systems across the region need to meet the require-
ments for EU membership. Instead, EU actors should think about how they 
can foster wider participation even during the accession negotiations, in 
order to ensure that reforms adopted with a view to achieving EU member-
ship do not remain dead letters upon the successful conclusion of acces-
sion talks.
The way forward: making EU 
reengagement in the Western 
Balkans a success
Despite initial positive signals sent by the European Commission for re-
newed commitment in the Western Balkans, the lack of both reform pro-
gress on the ground and formal progress on the path towards EU member-
ship show that enlargement policy is currently in a deadlock. As the new 
EU leadership is about to take over, mounting scepticism among European 
publics and several member state governments, in addition to widespread 
state capture and stagnating reforms in the Balkans, are causing deep 
frustration among reform-minded elites and citizens in the region. 
17
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In order to overcome this situation, concerted efforts will be required to 
tackle both the procedural as well as the substantive obstacles to progress 
that lie on the Western Balkans’ road to EU accession.
Maintain high-level engagement at member state level. 
The failure of the recent EU summit to open negotiations with either Alba-
nia or North Macedonia has left the entire region feeling neglected. Yet the 
line-up of incoming Council Presidencies can send a positive signal to the 
Western Balkans. Croatia is a natural ally and will hold the next EU-West-
ern Balkans Summit scheduled for May 2020 in Zagreb. The following trio 
Presidency of Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia has also decided to make 
the Western Balkans one of its three key priorities. By articulating a strong 
and coherent message of support to the region, and undertaking concrete 
steps to translate these messages into actions, these member states can 
demonstrate that the vast majority of EU decision-makers still support a 
vigorous and credible membership perspective for the Western Balkans.
Put the fight against state capture at the heart of enlargement policy. 
Both the Commission and the European Parliament have become bolder 
in calling out widespread state capture in the Western Balkans. Now is the 
time to move from analysis to action. By highlighting both specific short-
comings and involving local actors in developing solutions to drive back 
informal structures and privilege accountable and transparent administra-
tions, the EU institutions can signal to Western Balkan leaders that state 
capture and authoritarian trends will no longer be overlooked in favour of 
relative stability.
Highlight irregular progress in Serbia and Montenegro. 
The European Commission and the incoming EU leadership more general-
ly should not hesitate to highlight the growing discrepancy between formal 
compliance with membership criteria and declining democratic standards 
in both countries. 
18
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Where political leaders fail to address persistent shortcomings, the EU 
should consider making use of the leverage afforded by the suspension 
clause related to lack of progress in the crucial chapters 23 and 24 to un-
derline the central importance of rule of law reforms for the overall acces-
sion process. When accompanied by the right rhetoric and an engagement 
beyond governmental circles, this step can help reformist forces inside the 
countries hold their elites accountable, including for a lack of progress in 
EU accession negotiations that are due to government leaders prioritising 
private over public interests.
Engage beyond the executive. 
To overcome the current entrenchment of state capture and the domi-
nance of ruling parties and their leaders, it is crucial that the EU engages 
beyond the government. An emphasis needs to be placed on empowering 
parliamentarians, strengthening the independence of the judiciary, and as-
sociating relevant civil society actors in areas such as the rule of law and 
environmental policy, where they have expertise and can make a contribu-
tion towards the improvement of public policies. This can including making 
public consultations as well as meaningful debate a formal requirement 
for any major new laws adopted in the context of EU accession talks, and 
refusing laws adopted by urgent procedure that side-line domestic debate.
Improve the communication of enlargement policy towards EU citizens.
Enlargement policy generally flies under the radar when it comes to EU 
communication towards citizens in member states. This allows biases and 
stereotypes towards aspiring member states to develop, potentially grow-
ing reluctance towards the admission of further member states. Instead, 
the European Commission, especially through its local offices across the 
EU, should adopt more proactive communication on enlargement-related 
issues, both to inform the general public about this policy and the current 
state of play, and to encourage critical debate that will allow EU citizens to 
appreciate the strict monitoring by the European Commission of any and 
all accession candidates.
19
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Develop closer ties with Western Balkan citizens. 
Lack of local ownership and commitment to the enlargement process is 
one of the central challenges for the Western Balkans. The EU should seek 
to build support from below by engaging more directly with citizens and 
enhancing its own visibility on the ground. 
This may include allowing Western Balkans citizens to feed into ongoing 
consultations at the EU level and developing a more proactive communi-
cation strategy when it comes to familiarising citizens with the benefits 
of membership, for instance through public events and an expansion of 
people-to-people programmes, particularly beyond the circles of well-ed-
ucated students that already hold positive attitudes towards the EU insti-
tutions.
Strengthen civil society as a domestic check on the executive. 
The European Commission in particular has a long-standing engagement 
with civil society actors in the region. At a time when these are coming 
under increased pressure from national governments, it is important that 
the Commission, as well as the European Parliament and member states, 
take a clear stand on the importance of alternative, including critical, voic-
es during the accession negotiations. This includes supporting their local 
contacts in maintaining their independence and their ability to conduct 
effective domestic monitoring of reform efforts and hold their politicians 
accountable. This requires both explicit political support for independent 
civil society actors and an increase in funding supplied to these, in line 
with the increase of the EU’s overall offer to the Western Balkans.
Improve coordination between EU institutions and EU member states.
By holding more regular meetings between representatives of the Euro-
pean Commission, the European Parliament, and member state officials 
(from beyond the Brussels circles!), sceptical member states can be kept 
more closely informed and made aware of developments in the region. 
Moreover, such forums would serve to rebuild EU capitals’ trust in the 
Commission.
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Involve the Balkan countries in the Conference on the Future of Europe. 
The new European Commission President could extend an invitation to 
Balkan leaders and civil society members when discussing policy priori-
ties relevant to both sides, such as climate change and environment, digi-
talisation, migration, the rule of law, or the economy.
Open a dialogue on democracy inside the EU. 
While the EU is very active in promoting democracy abroad, recent rule of 
law violations among several member states have shown that key actors 
do not always agree on what democracy means and how it can best be 
protected. Engaging a deeper dialogue in this area, both between member 
states and in association with the Western Balkans, would facilitate a com-
mon understanding and the definition of measures to safeguard democra-
cy and the rule of law, including beyond the accession date.
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About the European Fund for the
Balkans
The European Fund for the Balkans is a joint initiative of European foundations 
that envisions, runs and supports initiatives aimed at strengthening democracy, 
fostering European integration and affirming the role of the Western Balkans in 
addressing Europe’s emerging challenges. The up-to-date programme strategy is 
based on three overarching areas – Capacity Development, Policy Development 
and Regional Cooperation - and channelled via flagship programmes and selected 
projects, complemented with a set of actions arising from EFB’s regional identity 
as a relevant player in its fields of focus. Their synergetic effects are focussed on 
continuous “Europeanisation” of the policies and practices of the Western Balkans 
countries on their way to EU accession, through merging of the region’s social 
capacity building with policy platform development, and a culture of regional 
cooperation. 
Contact: 
ALEKSANDRA TOMANIĆ, Executive Director, European Fund for the Balkans 
aleksandra.tomanic@balkanfund.org, +381 (0) 11 3239 877, European Fund for the 
Balkans, Majke Jevrosime20, 11 000 Belgrade, Serbia, www.balkanfund.org
22
Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group
About the Centre for Southeast 
European Studies, University of Graz
The Centre for Southeast European Studies was set up in November 2008 following 
the establishment of Southeast Europe as a strategic priority at the University of 
Graz in 2000. The Centre is an interdisciplinary and cross-faculty institution for 
research and education, established with the goal to provide space for the rich 
teaching and research activities at the university on and with Southeast Europe 
and to promote interdisciplinary collaboration. Since its establishment, the centre 
also aimed to provide information and documentation and to be a point of contact 
for media and the public interested in Southeast Europe, in terms of political, 
legal, economic and cultural developments. An interdisciplinary team of lawyers, 
historians, and political scientists working at the Centre has contributed to 
research on Southeast Europe, through numerous articles, monographs and other 
publications. In addition, the centre regularly organizes international conferences 
and workshops to promote cutting edge research on Southeast Europe. 
Contact: 
UNIV.-PROF. DR. FLORIAN BIEBER Professor of Southeast European Studies 
florian.bieber@uni-graz.at +43/316/380 6822 Centre for Southeast European 
Studies, University of Graz, Universitätsstraße 15/K3 A-8010 Graz 
www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at
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Notes:
www.biepag.eu
